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This article centers on Baraldini v. Meese, 691
F.Supp. 432 (D.D.C. 1988), a case that arose as a result
of Congressional and public inquiry into the conditions
at the Federal Correctional Institution at Lexington,
Kentucky, Female High Security Unit ("Lexington
HSU" or "the HSU"), a subterranean unit housing a
small population of political and social prisoners in a
segregated and highly restricted setting of small group
isolation. The combination of public pressure and Con-
gressional inquiry produced only minor changes in the
conditions. A team of lawyers' filed suit on behalf of
three women, Silvia Baraldini, Susan Rosenberg, and
Sylvia Brown, seeking immediately to enjoin continued
placement in the HSU.2 The suit asserted that placement
in the unit violated the prisoners' First Amendment
rights of expression and association, that placement
without prior hearing violated Fifth Amendment due
process rights, and that the conditions violated the
women's Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel
and unusual punishment.
A correctional psychologist concluded after evaluating
the Female High Security Unit at Lexington HSU:
* Jan Susler is an attorney at the People's Law Office in
Chicago, IL.
1. The team of lawyers included Jan Susler and Michael
Deutsch, Peoples Law Office, Chicago, IL; Adjoa Aiyetoro and
Alexa Freeman, ACLU National Prison Project, Washington,
D.C.; Elizabeth Fink, Brooklyn, NY; Mary O'Melveny, New
York, NY; Margaret Ratner and Joan Gibbs, Center for Con-
stitutional Rights, New York, NY.
2. Susa iRosenberg and Alejandrina Torres were the first
to arrive at HSU on October 29, 1986. They were later joined
by Sylvia Baraldini. All three women are in prison for politi-
cally motivated acts or conspiracies to act against the United
States government. Alejandrina Torres, is a Puerto Rican in-
dependentista who claimed status under the international law of
prisoners of war and refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the
United States courts. She did not participate in the litigation.
The third plaintiff, Sylvia Brown, was placed in the unit be-
cause of a history of escapes from several prisons. Brown was
This program sets up a hierarchy of objectives. The
first of these is to reduce prisoners to the state of
submission essential for their ideological conversion.
That failing, the next objective is to reduce them to
a state of psychological incompetence sufficient to
neutralize them as efficient, self-directing antago-
nists. That failing, the only alternative is to destroy
them, preferably by making them desperate enough
to destroy themselves.'
Under the laws of the United States, the government
can imprison those convicted of crimes, and where there
is evidence that a prisoner has posed a threat to security
in previous institutions, can increase security. However,
labelling a prisoner a security threat based solely on as-
sociations she had prior to conviction with organizations
called "terrorist" by the government is unconstitutional.
Prison officials may impose restrictions tailored to meet
real threats to security, but may not impose restrictions
based on a prisoner's political beliefs or associations, or
based merely on speculation and conjecture. As Alejan-
placed in the unit on May 7, 1987. The Bureau of Prisons
("BOP") rejected her for placement after the first referral in
spite of her numerous escapes. She has no political affiliations.
Likewise, Debra Brown, the only woman in the U.S. facing
three death sentences, was the fifth prisoner placed in the unit
on January 15, 1987. Two other women arrived shortly before
the unit closed: Bonnie Kelley, placed as a witness protection
case, not a high security case, based on her cooperation with the
government against a co-defendant; and Lynette Fromme, as-
signed following her conviction for a walk-away escape from
FCI Alderson, W. Va., which was not alleged to have had assis-
tance from outside groups. These social prisoners chose not to
participate in the litigation.
3. The development of psychological syndromes resulting
from isolation has been documented in the 19th and early 20th
centuries in Europe and with U.S. prisoners of war in Korea.
See Stuart Grassian, A REVIEW AND DELINEATION OF A
CLINICAL SYNDROME (unpublished). Such brainwashing tech-
niques have also been used in Korean and Chinese prisons. See
Richard Korn, The Effects of Confinement in HSU, August,
1987, 15 SOCIAL JUSTICE 8-19 (Spring, 1988).
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drina Torres, Susan Rosenberg, and then Silvia
Baraldini, the first women to be placed in the Lexington
HSU, had no record of posing a security threat in prison,
but instead were political activists affiliated with radical
groups, the treatment of these women indicates that the
United States treats prisoners differently - in fact, inhu-
manely - because of their political affiliations and
beliefs.
In Baraldini v. Meese, Judge Barrington D. Parker
accepted the claim made by plaintiffs Baraldini and Ro-
senberg that they had been placed in the HSU solely be-
cause of their associations with groups identified by the
government as "terrorist," and rejected the BOP's claim
that the plaintiffs were assigned to Lexington HSU be-
cause they posed a security threat - a threat of escape
by external assault on the prison from outside groups."
The government was unable to show that assignment to
the restrictive setting bore any rational relationship to a
legitimate penological objective. Accordingly, the district
court found that the placement of the prisoners in the
high security unit was "an exaggerated response," in vio-
lation of their First Amendment rights.5
The conditions in the unit demonstrated that the pro-
gram was designed not to thwart external assault to free
the women but to effect their psychological and ideologi-
cal breakdown. The restricted sensory environment, small
group isolation, ill-fitting clothing, limited and censored
reading material, shackling and handcuffing, and strict
limitation on telephone calls and visitors, as well as strip
The conditions in the unit demonstrated
that the program was designed not to
thwart external assault to free women
but to effect their psychological and ide-
ological breakdown.
searches, patdown searches, voyeurism and general har-
assment by guards, had little or no relation to the govern-
ment's stated objective of preventing escape.6
The placement of these women was suspect not
merely because their prison records did not warrant tight
security, but because other women with prison discipli-
nary records, with histories of escape, and with equally as
lengthy sentences were not placed in the unit.7
4. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 435, 440.
5. Id. at 442-444.
6. Id. at 444. The plaintiffs also claimed that conditions at
Lexington HSU violated the Eighth Amendment prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. While the inhumaneness
per se of the prisoners' treatment is analytically distinct from
the First Amendment freedom of association issue, and the
court rejected the Eighth Amendment claim (Id. at 447), the
conditions were nevertheless punitive, indicating the punishment
of these prisoners on the basis of their political associations and
beliefs.
7. Id. at 448. Deposition of FCI Pleasanton Warden Rob
Roberts 179-180 (May 24, 1988); Deposition of BOP Assistant
Director Gil Ingram 31-32 (May 26, 1988); Deposition of BOP
Southeast Regional Director Gary McCune 56-59 (May 27,
The United States has historically asserted that the
treatment of its prisoners is humane, and that it has no
political prisoners. Looking to Cuba and other countries,
the U.S. has claimed that prisoners there, especially po-
litical prisoners, are abused and treated inhumanely.
However, a recent human rights report on Cuban prisons
reveals that the women's prison, which houses a popula-
tion of 600, boasts not only good facilities for activities,
working conditions and cells (including punishment
cells), but also courteous and respectful relations between
officials and prisoners.' Furthermore, in Cuba, "political
prisoners" are not singled out for different punishment.'
The fundamental issue presented by Baraldini v.
Meese is the failure of the United States government to
admit to the existence of political prisoners and the exis-
tence of a policy to single them out for special - and
harsher - treatment because of their beliefs and
affiliations.
Lexington HSU in its Historical Context - One Phase in
a Continuing Strategy
Torres, Baraldini, and Rosenberg are not the first po-
litical activists to be singled out for punitive treatment.
Retaliatory prison conditions for political people are part
of the U.S. government's historical efforts to destroy
those who oppose the U.S. government as well as the
movements they represent. While the HSU and other
prisons, such as USP Marion, 10 are architecturally
adapted to accomplish this objective, a physical plant is
not crucial to meeting the government's end. Other effec-
tive tactics include placing long term prisoners in pretrial
detention facilities or frequently shuffling prisoners from
one cell to another, one prison to another.
The U.S. has a long history of attempts to crush the
Puerto Rican independence movement." The indepen-
dence movement has been a focus of government repres-
sion since the U.S. invaded in 1898. Within the last sev-
eral years, Puerto Rico has been considered by the
1988). All depositions, declarations, memoranda, letters, post
orders, transcript references and testimony refer to evidence
presented in Baraldini v. Meese, 691 F. Supp. 432 (D.D.C.
1988), unless otherwise noted.
8. The Institute for Policy Studies, PRELIMINARY REPORT
OF U.S. DELEGATION TO CUBA, February 26-March 5, 1988.
9. J. Treaster, Cuban Prison Life Is Said to Improve, New
York Times at A6 (May 31, 1988).
10. The U.S. penitentiary at Marion, IL is the most maxi-
mum security prison in the federal system. Since 1983, it has
been on lockdown. The men are confined to their single cells
over 22 hours a day, allowed no contact visits, and have no ac-
cess to programs. Policies at Marion include "cavity-searches,"
forced digital probes of the rectum (random in all units except
the Control Unit, where it is routine and performed without
probable cause), and shackling prisoners spread-eagled to con-
crete bunks fitted with metal rings for this very purpose. Condi-
tions at Marion were sufficient to warrant an observer from
Amnesty International. See note 72 and accompanying text.
11. Alejandrina Torres is a Puerto Rican independentista
whom the government says is a member of the FALN, Fuerzas
Armadas de Liberacion Nacional (Armed Forces of National
Liberation). Both Rosenberg and Baraldini are said by the gov-
ernment to be associated with the FALN as well as other politi-
cal organizations.
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government to be "the Achilles Heel of the United
States."'" In reaction to militant opposition, the U.S.
government has often resorted to violent action. Exam-.
pies include the 1937 massacre at Ponce;' 3 the violent
suppression of the 1950 Nationalist uprisings; and the
imprisonment in the 1950s in U.S. prisons of many who
took militant nationalist actions - including Rafael Can-
cel Miranda, Oscar Collazo, Irving Flores, Lolita Lebron,
and Andres Figueroa Cordero"4 - many who led the
party - including Pedro Albizu Campos and Juan
Antonio Corretjer - and thousands who merely held
Nationalist sympathies.
In 1960, the FBI formalized its domestic counterintel-
ligence program, COINTELPRO, to destroy the inde- '
pendence movement both in Puerto Rico and the U.S.,
stating its interest to be in disruption, not "mere harass-
ment."' 5 Agents proceeded to create factionalism by
planting defamatory articles in newspapers, collecting in-
telligence on the personal lives of movement leaders, and
preparing divisive and defamatory false letters. 6
Attacks on the independence movement are ongoing,
and include the maintenance by the Puerto Rican police
of files on thousands of supporters of independence, la-
beled by the police as "subversives"; the convening of
U.S. grand juries to "investigate" the FALN and concur-
rent imprisonment without charge of subpoenaed inde-
12. William Webster, Confirmation Hearings for Nomina-
tion as Director of the CIA, March 1987, in Movimiento de
Liberacion Nacional Puertorriqueno, PROGRAMS AND IDEOL-
OGY OF THE MOVIMIENTO DE LIBERACION NACIONAL PU-
ERTORRIQUENO 35 (July 3, 1987).
13. Nationalist Party members and sympathizers who had
gathered in Ponce to peacefully protest the jailing of the Na-
tionalist leaders and commemorate the abolition of slavery were
gunned down in the street by police operating under direct or-
ders from the U.S. colonial governor. The death toll was 21,
with 150 wounded. See generally Arthur Garfield Hays, Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union, REPORTS OF THE COMMISSION OF IN-
QUIRY ON CIVIL RIGHTS IN PUERTO Rico (July 17, 1942).
14. These five patriots served from 25 to 29 years each in
U.S. prisons. The inhumane conditions visited upon them and
their loved ones, because of their pro-independence beliefs and
associations, include placement in the most maximum security
prisons available, or in the most maximum security units in
other prisons; deliberate withholding of medical care (which in
the case of Figueroa Cordero permitted cancer to spread); and
banning family contact. Figueroa Cordero was released only
months before he died of cancer. His release and the subsequent
release of the four in 1979 were obtained only after an interna-
tional human rights campaign on their behalf.
15. FBI Memorandum from Director J. Edgar Hoover (Au-
gust 4, 1960), reprinted in Flint Taylor & Margaret Van
Houten, eds., COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: A DOCUMENTARY LOOK
AT AMERICA'S SECRET POLICE 7 (1979)
("COUNTERINTELLIGENCE").
16. "As part of our continuing program to disrupt the mili-
tant subversive groups seeking independence for Puerto Rico,
the New York Office prepared a letter attacking one of the
leaders of the Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico. The letter was
written as though it were from a member of the Movimiento
Pro Independencia de Puerto Rico (MPIPR) and was mailed
anonymously on July 12, 1966 from New York City to selected
nationalists in both Puerto Rico and New York City. These two
organizations are the largest and most dangerous of the pro-
independence groups." U.S. v. Alejandrina Torres, et. al., No.
83-CR-0494, Appendix at 7 (W.D.II. 1983) (petition for dis-
missal or removal of criminal charges and other relief under
international law), citing FBI Memorandum (August 5, 1966).
pendence activists who refused to testify, invoking a prin-
ciple of non-collaboration with the government's attempts
to destroy their movement;' and the prosecution in the
U.S. of public independence activists and militants for
the expropriation of seven million government-insured
dollars, following years of highly intrusive and illegal
video and audio surveillance. 8
The U.S. has developed a strategy to repress such
movements, turning to a form of domestic counterin-
surgency. 9 In 1978 in Puerto Rico, military and counter-
intelligence experts from countries experienced in
counterinsurgency, including those who implemented ef-
forts to destroy the Red Army Faction in West Germany,
the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the Irish Republican
Army were called together to a secret conference to con-
sult with the U.S. on its "problem" in Puerto Rico."0
From this conference emerged a strategy for Puerto Rico
which envisioned the extensive use of high technology
and electronic surveillance, the criminalization of pro-in-
dependence activity, the use of unprecedented "security"
measures at trials of independentistas, denial of the
movement's access to the media, and isolation of prison-
ers to separate them from their movement and deny them
their political identities.2 '
The Black liberation movement, from Martin Luther
King to Malcolm X to the Black Panther Party ("BPP"),
was also targeted by the FBI's COINTELPRO program,
in a design to "expose, disrupt, misdirect, discredit, or
otherwise neutralize the activities of black nationalist
hate-type organizations and groupings, their leadership,
spokesmen, membership and supporters."'" The then FBI
director, J. Edgar Hoover, viewed the BPP as the "single
greatest threat," which should become the subject "of
imaginative and hard-hitting counterintelligence mea-
sures aimed at crippling the BPP."'21 COINTELPRO
tactics used against the Black Liberation Movement, the
Puerto Rican Independence Movement, and the Ameri-
can Indian Movement shared common features: surveil-
lance and intelligence gathering, fabricated correspon-
dence, false propaganda, disinformation, false reports,
infiltration by agent provocateurs, snitch-jacketing,
17. See Michael Deutsch, The Improper Use of the Federal
Grand Jury: An Instrument for the Internment of Political Ac-
tivists, 75 JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1159
(1984).
18. U.S. v. Victor Manuel Gerena et. al., Crim. No. H-85-
50 (D. Conn. 1985).
19. The U.S. Pentagon has provided the following definition
of counterinsurgency: "Those military, para-military, political,
economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a govern-
ment to defeat subversive insurgency." See DICTIONARY OF
UNITED STATES MILITARY TERMS FOR JOINT USAGE.
20. The secret conference,"Special Seminar on Terrorism,"
funded by the U.S. Department of Justice, convened in San
Juan, Puerto Rico in 1978. Documents from this conference
were mailed anonymously to Michael Deutsch, an attorney at
the People's Law Office in Chicago, IL.
21. "Special Seminar on Terrorism," San Juan, Puerto Rico
(1978).
22. FBI Memorandum from Director J. Edgar Hoover (Au-
gust 25, 1967), reprinted in Taylor & Van Houten, COUNTER-
INTELLIGENCE at 12 (cited in note 15).
23. FBI Memorandum (November 25, 1968), reprinted in
Taylor & Van Houten, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE at 23.
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fabrication of evidence, and assassination. 4 An FBI
memo spelled out the goals of destroying the self-deter-
mination efforts of Black people, including "preventing
the rise of a messiah," preventing leaders from gaining
respectability by discrediting them, and preventing the
development of organizations, especially among youth. 5
Pursuant to the COINTELPRO program, Panther
leaders were murdered (Fred Hampton and Mark Clark
were killed as they slept in their own beds by Chicago
police and State's Attorney's police, who had received a
diagram of the apartment where these men slept from an
FBI informant provocateur 6) and many were framed
with criminal charges which have resulted in two decades
of imprisonment, including Geronimo ji Jaga Pratt, Her-
man Bell, Albert Nuh Washington, Anthony Jalil Bot-
tom, Dhoruba al-Mujahid Bin Wahad (formerly Richard
Dhoruba Moore), Sundiata Acoli, and sn27 Clark
Squire . 8 Treated more harshly than non-political prison-
ers, these men have been placed at the most maximum
security prisons available, including USP Marion, iso-
lated in segregation units for years on end, and trans-
ferred frequently between prisons. 9
No Pedestal Here: The Focus on Women and the Creation
of Lexington HSU
The late 1970s and early 1980s witnessed a greater
number of women in federal prison for politically moti-
vated acts related to the Puerto Rican independence
movement and the Black liberation and anti-imperialist
struggles.3 0 Although there was no reason the Bureau
could not integrate these women into general population,
it refused to do so. Instead, it created two options: hous-
ing the sentenced women in the Metropolitan Correc-
tional Centers, pretrial detention facilities designed for
short-term stays, or placing them in Davis Hall at FCI
Alderson, W. Va., and later in Davis Hall's pre-HSU ex-
24. Ward Churchill & Jim VanderWall, AGENTS OF RE-
PRESSION 39-54, 176, 177, 344-381 (1988). Some of these tac-
tics were also applied to the "New Left." See FBI Memoran-
dum from Director J. Edgar Hoover (October 23, 1968),
reprinted in Taylor & Van Houten, COUNTERINTELLIGENCE at
30.
25. FBI Memorandum from Director J. Edgar Hoover
(March 4, 1968), reprinted in Taylor & Van Houten,
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE at 17-21.
26. Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th Cir. 1979),
settled in the appeal for $1.85 million.
27. "sn" denotes a Slave Name.
28. Churchill & VanderWall, AGENTS OF REPRESSION at
77-94, 366 (cited in note 24); El Coqui, ed., CAN'T JAIL THE
SPIRIT, POLITICAL PRISONERS IN THE U.S.: A COLLECTION OF
BIOGRAPHIES 74-76, 53-55, 92-93, 58-60, 89-91, 45-46 (1989)
("CAN'T JAIL THE SPIRIT").
29. See generally, CAN'T JAIL THE SPIRIT.
30. Assata Shakur, convicted in 1977 of felony murder in
relation to the Black Liberation Army; Marilyn Buck, convicted
in the mid-1970s for weapons charges in relation to the Black
Liberation Army; Rita (Bo) Brown, convicted in 1978 of bank
robbery and weapons charges in relation to the anti-capitalist
George Jackson Brigade; Maria Haydee Beltran Torres, con-
victed in 1980 of a bombing and death in connection with the
FALN; Ida Luz Rodriguez, Dylcia Pagan, and Carmen Valen-
tin, convicted in 1981 of seditious conspiracy in connection with
the FALN.
perimental unit, the Cardinal Unit. 1 Virtually all the
women convicted in 1980-81 of FALN related activity
have been held in one or both of these alternatives. How-
ever, the lack of programs and other inadequacies, 2 in-
cluding the neglect of the women's health in the restric-
tive settings, combined with a public human rights
campaign waged by the Puerto Rican independence
movement and its supporters, led the Bureau to abandon
these options. Many of the politically-affiliated prisoners
and prisoners of war 3 were ultimately placed in the gen-
eral population at the Federal Correctional Institution,
Pleasanton, in Dublin, CA, where they have since func-
tioned without incident in this open environment.
Prison officials effectively conceded that treatment of
these women would be unrelated to their in-prison con-
duct, by continuing to seek a more restrictive and isolated
setting in spite of the women's, exemplary conduct. On
October 29, 1986, this restrictive setting became a reality
- the Female High Security Unit (HSU) opened in the
federal prison in Lexington, KY. This prison within a
Retaliatory prison conditions for politi-
cal people are part of the U.S. govern-
ment's historical efforts to destroy those
who oppose the U.S. government.
prison apparently had as one of its purposes to isolate and
break women members of militant movements who the
government would call "terrorist." '
BOP spokespersons readily admitted to Congress35
31. Lolita Lebron was in Davis Hall, as were Assata Sha-
kur and Rita (Bo) Brown in the 1970s. In the 1980s, the Bu-
reau of Prisons instituted the Cardinal Unit - electronically
monitored cages housing only Maria Haydee Beltran Torres
and Ida Luz Rodriguez, completely isolated from all other pris-
oners (and even from each other at first) for close to one year.
The women were confined to cells 24 hours a day, deprived of
all programming, all human contact, and much needed medical
attention. The women's placement in the Unit was not based on
their in-prison conduct, which had been exemplary. Rather,
they were assigned because of their political beliefs and associa-
tions (the government claims they are members of the FALN).
32. Deposition of former Bureau of Prisons Director, Nor-
man Carlson (May 27, 1988).
33. The women convicted of FALN-related activity as-
sumed the position of prisoner of war under international law,
citing their status as combatants in an anti-colonial war against
the U.S. See U.S. v. Maria Haydee Beltran Torres, No. 77-
CR-0680 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); U.S. v. Carlos Alberto Torres et
al., No. 80-0736 (N.D. I1 1980).
34. It is significant that the government chose to perform
this experiment on women, which appears to be guided by two
sexist notions. First, officials seemed to believe that political
women would be easier to break than their male counterparts.
Second, there seems to be the idea that women who break with
the traditional role in this patriarchal society and choose in-
stead to fight for a non-exploitative society warrant special pun-
ishment, to "cure" them of their "errant ways." This also
makes examples of the women and seeks to thereby deter other
women from following in their footsteps.
35. Norman Carlson letter to U.S. Representative Robert
Kastenmeier (October 9, 1986).
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and to the press 6 that the HSU was designed to deal
with "terrorists." To this end, the BOP drafted criteria
for placement in the Unit:
A prisoner's past or present affiliation, association
or membership in an organization which has been
documented as being involved in acts of violence,
attempts to disrupt or overthrow the government of
the United States ... is a factor considered by our
staff in assessing the security needs of any inmate.87
With these criteria, the government could effectively
punish prisoners based on their "affiliation[s], associa-
tion[s] or membership[s]." And under such criteria, the
BOP justified the disparate treatment of the women at
Lexington HSU.
The Women of Lexington HSU
In accordance with the government's underlying pur-
pose at HSU, Alejandrina Torres was one of the first two
women placed in the unit. She had received a 35-year
sentence for seditious conspiracy - conspiring to use
force to oust the U.S. from Puerto Rico - and related
charges.8 8 The conspiracy involved the FALN. She and
her three codefendants were alleged to have planned ex-
propriations to finance armed actions against U.S. mili-
tary sites, conspired to free an FALN member from
prison, and stockpiled weapons and explosives. The gov-
ernment has stated that Torres' offense and her political
affiliation are indistinguishable.8 9
For similar political reasons, the government placed
Susan Rosenberg in the HSU at the same time. The ini-
tial document recommending her transfer to the unit
states:
Rosenberg has been associated with the FALN,
Black Liberation Army, and other terrorist groups.
She also was thought to have been involved in an
[sic] 1981 Brinks Armed Car Robbery and has pre-
viously been linked to the Joanne Chesimard [As-
sata Shakur] escape in 1979. She also has
threatened in open court to take her armed revolu-
tion behind prison walls.'0
Rosenberg is serving a 58 year sentence for possession of
weapons, explosives and false identification.
Likewise for Silvia Baraldini, an Italian national anti-
36. Kim Stott, Planned Women's Prison Hit, Florida Times
Union at B-14 (March 8, 1988).
37. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 438.
38. U.S. v. Alejandrina Torres et al., No. 83-CR-0494
(N.D.II. 1983). The indictment against Torres and her three co-
defendants, Alberto Rodriguez, Edwin Cortes, and Jose Luis
Rodriguez, accused them of seditious conspiracy in violation of
18 U.S.C. §2384, conspiring "to oppose by force the authority
of the government of the United States" and attempting "to
bring about the political independence of Puerto Rico from the
United States by force and violence and by armed revolution
against the United States." -
39. Baraldini v. Thornburgh, No. 88-5275 (D.C. Cir.
1988), defendants-appellants' motion to expedite appeal, filed
September 9, 1988.
40. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 436.
imperialist whose initial transfer document states:
Ms. Baraldini is a member of the May 19th Com-
munist Party which is sympathetic to the radical
groups including the New African Freedom Front
and the FALN. She participated in the successful
1978 escape of JoAnne Chesimard [sic] from the
New Jersey State Women's Prison. Members of her
group have participated in numerous armed robber-
ies where police officers were wounded or killed."1
Baraldini is serving 43 years - 3 for criminal contempt
following her refusal to collaborate with government ef-
forts to secure her testimony at a grand jury investigating
the FALN and the Puerto Rican independence move-
ment; and 40 for a RICO (Racketeering Influence Cor-
rupt Organizations) conspiracy, for her participation with
a group waging armed actions in the name of ending op-
pression of Black people within the U.S. She was con-
victed of participating in the prison escape of Assata
Shakur, otherwise known as Joanne Chesimard.' 2 The
other women who comprised the tiny population seem to
have been placed in the HSU to mask the political nature
of the unit."8
The Conditions at the Lexington HSU
The treatment of the women at Lexington HSU illus-
trates government imposition of strict security measures
in an exaggerated response to its biased beliefs about
prisoners with left political affiliations. Moreover, the in-
carceration of these women was demonstrably more re-
strictive than that of prisoners serving equally lengthy
sentences, yet who lacked similar political associations,
even where those non-political women had histories of es-
cape. Designed to house 16 women, the unit never held
more than seven, and for the bulk of its two year life held
only five.
The physical layout of the prison was calculated to
demoralize the prisoners. Built in a basement, virtually
no natural light penetrated. Metal grates covered the few
windows, blocking out any light and obscuring the view
to the outside.'4 The women could not freely walk about
41. Id. at 436.
42. Shakur and the Black Liberation Army she was alleged
to be part of were targets of the FBI's COINTELPRO counter-
intelligence program. The campaign focus on Shakur began in
1971, culminating in her violent capture in 1973 (she was seri-
ously wounded by police bullets). She was acquitted of several
felonies, including bank robbery and killing a police officer.
Then in 1977, following a trial held amidst hysterical security
measures and inflammatory media reports, she was convicted of
assault with intent to kill a New Jersey state trooper and of
being an accomplice in the death of another trooper, and re-
manded to the Clinton Correctional Facility for Women in New
Jersey. It was from this prison in 1979 that she was spirited
away from her isolation cell. Shakur resides in Cuba, where she
has been granted political asylum. See generally Assata Shakur,
ASSATA: AN AUTOBIOGRAPHY (1987).
43. Out of apparent concern for the transparent political
nature of the HSU, the BOP initially placed two social prison-
ers in the unit. Two other social prisoners were transferred to
HSU near the end of its existence. See note 2.
44. Deposition of Stuart Grassian, M.D., 24, 34, 35 (May
31, 1984).
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the small living space." A dozen or more surveillance
cameras watched their every move. One hour a day they
were allowed into an outdoor concrete recreation area,
ringed by bricks and high wooden walls, equipped with a
video surveillance camera but no recreation equipment,
and accompanied by a guard. The unit also lacked pro-
grams and productive work opportunities."
The women described their harassment and sexual as-
sault by prison guards.47 Following every recreation hour,
female guards required the women to submit to a strip
search."' The shower, within the range of a camera, for
close to a year lacked a shower curtain.' 9 At times, male
guards stood and watched them shower, and would walk
into the women's cells unannounced as the women sat on
the toilet or were in various states of undress." Male
guards inappropriately pat-searched the women fre-
quently, termed "personal patdown searches" by the
court." In addition, the women were shackled, hand-
cuffed and accompanied by four prison guards on their
scheduled visits to the prison doctor and dentist, followed
by a strip search upon return to the unit.52 Medical at-
tention was afforded only after long delays, and even
then was delivered while shackles were in place and while
a male guard was at their side or within eyeshot - even
for procedures which required undressing. 3
The rules prohibited contact with prisoners other than
those few in the HSU, though the prison which housed
the HSU contained over 1,000 prisoners in a minimum-
medium security general population."' The rules also pro-
hibited most contact with anyone outside the unit-phone
calls were limited to two brief calls a week, and visits
restricted to immediate family.55 This worked a special
hardship: Baraldini's immediate family lived in Italy, and
Rosenberg is the only child of elderly parents in New
York. The government's definition of immediate family
narrowed the possible visits in Torres' case, ruling out her
son-in-law and grandchildren. The hours of visitation
were restricted, as was the space available for visitation."
Contact by mail was also restricted; incoming mail, in-
cluding that containing political literature, was often re-
jected or just never delivered.
The room temperature was inadequate in winter, and
45. Testimony of Susan Rosenberg, Transcript at 26-27
(June 7, 1988); Deposition of Silvia Baraldini at 55 (May 31,
1988).
46. Declaration of Silvia Baraldini (March 25, 1988).
47. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 444.
48. Id. Officials modified this policy just before the lawsuit
was filed, to permit "random" as opposed to routine strip
searches. Id. at 445.
49. Id. at 444.
50. Id.
51. Id.; Declaration of Silvia Baraldini (March 25, 1988).
52. Id. at 444.
53. Letter to Jan Susler from Aiejandrina Torres (Febru-
ary, 1987).
54. Declaration of Susan Rosenberg (March 30, 1988);
Deposition of Lexington Warden Larry DuBois (May 23,
1988).
55. Deposition of Silvia Baraldini (May 31, 1988); Testi-
mony of Susan Rosenberg, Transcript at 62-63 (June 7, 1988).
56. Declaration of Sylvia Brown (May 12, 1988); Testi-
mony of Susan Rosenberg, Transcript at 64-66 (June 7, 1988).
the staff did not provide appropriate clothing. The
women were given drab beige uniforms, culottes, so that
they would look "feminine."'" Fire safety was not accom-
modated. Hot water was rarely available for bathing.5
The attitude of the guard staff toward the women va-
ried between harassing them and ignoring them. 9 The
women were completely dependent on the guards for
their every need, including having to ask for sanitary
napkins one or two at a time, or moving from the cell
area to the day room area of the unit.6" Guards taunted
the women that they would never leave the HSU, telling
them they had one way tickets."1 The women were sys-
tematically deprived of sleep during one three month pe-
riod. 2 These conditions clearly had no rational relation-
ship to the Bureau's stated purpose of preventing escape
from external assault by "terrorist" groups.63 A psychia-
trist hired by the Bureau as an expert witness arrived at
the same conclusion.
6'
Special limitations applied to the HSU that pertained
to no other federal prison. No other prison in the BOP is
closed to the public, as was Lexington. Even at Marion,
the highest security prison for men in the system, the Bu-
reau, needing to respond to public pressure about ram-
pant human rights violations there, regularly hosts public
relations tours from high school and university classes
and other groups. Yet Bureau officials rebuffed requests
for delegations to the HSU from the National Lawyers
Guild, the American Public Health Association, a group
of prominent women from Kentucky, and others, claim-
ing the unit was not open for public inspection. Also
unlike Marion, journalists were either turned away com-
pletely, or had their integrity impugned, being told they
could not bring their tape recorders or cameras lest they
smuggle contraband. Furthermore, HSU was the only
maximum security prison for women in the federal sys-
tem. At other BOP federal correctional institutions with
general populations of women (including women with
equally lengthy sentences and convicted of violent crimes
and escape), conditions were substantially less restrictive.
The women freely move about within the compound;
have access to outside recreation over four hours daily
(including team activities); are strip searched only after
57. Declaration of Susan Rosenberg (May 12, 1988).
58. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 444.
59. Id. at 445.
60. "Because we are allowed no personal property, not even
our own sanitary pads, I must ask the guards for sanitary prod-
ucts constantly which is degrading." Declaration of Silvia
Baraldini (March 25, 1988); See also Deposition of Plaintiff's
Expert Louisa Brown (May 31, 1988).
61. Testimony of Susan Rosenberg, Transcript at 76-77
(June 7, 1988).
62. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 444.
63. Id. at 443-444.
64. Defendant's Expert William Logan, Md., letter to Bu-
reau of Prisons Asst. Dir. for Correctional Programs, Gil In-
gram (March 7, 1988).
65. See, e.g., BOP Director Quinlan letter to NLG execu-
tive director Michael Cowan, BOP Director (January 25,
1988); Quinlan letter to NLG attorney Peter Erlinder (Decem-
ber 14, 1987); Lexington Warden R.L. Matthews letter to Rene
Bideaux, Deputy General Secretary, General Board of Global
Ministries, United Methodist Church (February 26, 1987).
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contact with people from the street; have a variety of
work settings .to select from and people with which to in-
teract (including virtually unrestricted visits from friends
and relatives); have access to the phone for 15 hours
daily, are permitted to wear their own clothing and pos-
sess a quantity of personal property; and are not locked
down in their cells, even at night."6
These policies and restrictions took their toll on the
women held at HSU. Reports and testimony from psy-
chology and psychiatry experts documented that they
suffered symptoms flowing from the lengthy detention in
the restricted environment, otherwise known as small
group isolation. The symptoms fell into four categories:
1) Sensory disturbances. They became hypersensitive
to external stimuli and often experienced a dysesthetic
response. For example, the smell from the food trays dis-
gusted them, their appetites were diminished, and they
lost weight. They also experienced perceptual distortions,
seeing spots and shapes, often mistaking them for objects.
2) Disturbances of affect. They experienced overt
panic attacks and free floating anxiety. This category in-
cludes depression.
3) Difficulty in thinking and concentrating. These
symptoms include not just an inability to read but to fo-
cus one's attention. The disability in one case reached the
point of profound apathy and withdrawal.
4) Disturbances of thought content. Here, the women
were obsessed with rage as well as with the state of their
bodies and minds, fearing the deterioration that was
occurring.
The F.B.L formalized its domestic
counterintelligence program,
COINTELPRO, to destroy the indepen-
dence movement both in Puerto Rico
and the U.S., stating its interest to be in
disruption, not "mere harassment.'"
Such symptoms in a restricted environment constitute
a syndrome which was documented in German literature
as early as the late 1800s, and gained some attention in
the U.S. after U.S. soldiers were held in small group iso-
lation in Korean POW camps,6" and was lately docu-
mented by Amnesty International when in 1980 it de-
nounced the Federal Republic of Germany's small group
isolation of Red Army Fraction (RAF) political
prisoners.68
The symptoms experienced by the women at HSU in-
creased with the length of exposure to the restricted con-
66. These prisons include the Federal Correctional Institu-
tions at Pleasanton, California, Lexington, Kentucky, and Al-
derson, West Virginia, the three main women's prisons in the
federal system existing at the time.
67. Stuart Grassian, PSYCHOPATHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF
SOLITARY CONFINEMENT ? (unpublished).
68. Amnesty International, PRISON CONDITIONS OF PER-
SONS SUSPECTED OR CONVICTED OF POLITICALLY MOTIVATED
CRIMES IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY: ISOLATION
AND SOLITARY CONFINEMENT (May, 1980).
ditions.69 Nor was the women's suffering lost on Bureat
officials:
The Court has little doubt that Unit Manager
Figlestahler and other personnel at the High Secur-
ity Unit were well aware of plaintiffs' various com-
plaints regarding staff treatment and the psycholog-
ical -effects that they suffered. 0
Moved by the similarity of the HSU to the German
experiments with the RAF prisoners, Amnesty Interna-
Even though those concessions had been
made, the bureau still operates a unit
that in many respects, measures below
acceptable standards for federal prisons.
tional dispatched an observer from the United Kingdom,
who noted about the HSU:
The conditions and regime are deliberately and gra-
tuitously oppressive. The constant and unjustified
use of security chains, the repeated strip searching,
the almost total lack of privacy, the claustrophobic
lack of sensory stimuli, freedom of movement, pos-
sessions, choice of activities and incestuously small
range of contacts cannot be other than debilitating
• ..There is no need for these prisoners to be at
HSU . . .There is overwhelming evidence that the
prisoners at HSU have deteriorated physically and
psychologically during their custody there. There
has to be a prospect that one or more will finally
resort to suicide should their custody at HSU be
prolonged. I conclude therefore that HSU should
close forthwith.7"
The conditions and placement of the women on the basis
of their politics was found to constitute cruel, inhuman
and degrading treatment in violation of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights."
Addressing the Eighth Amendment issue of whether
the treatment at Lexington HSU constituted "cruel and
unusual punishment," the district court found there had
been no "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."
7 3
69. In his follow up study, correctional psychologist Richard
Korn found that the women had deteriorated to the point of
danger. Richard Korn, The Effects of Confinement in HSU: A
Follow-Up, November, 1987, 15 SOCIAL JUSTICE 25 (Spring,
1988).
70. Baraldini 691 F.Supp. at 446.
71. Amnesty International, THE HIGH SECURITY UNIT,
LEXINGTON FEDERAL PRISON, KY 15 (August, 1988).
72. Only once before in the history of U.S. prisons has Am-
nesty International observed and/or condemneda prison in the
U.S. In 1987, Amnesty International found the U.S. Peniten-
tiary at Marion, IL to violate the United Nations Standard
Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners. Amnesty Inter-
national, ALLEGATIONS OF ILL-TREATMENT IN MARION PRISON,
ILLINOIS, USA ? (May, 1987).
73. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 446, quoting Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97, 103 (1976).
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Nevertheless, the Court was clearly troubled by the con-
ditions in the HSU, viewing the BOP's last minute, insig-
nificant modifications of the conditions not just as too lit-
tle, too late, but rather a sorry response and "a shameful
reflection on the Bureau's administration . . . . Even
though those concessions had been made, the Bureau still
operates a unit that in many respects, measures below ac-
ceptable standards for federal prisons. ' '7" The Court ex-
pressed that the "defendants' sluggish response to plain-
tiffs' requests [for medical attention] borders very close
to neglect", noted the defendants' "gross insensitivity,"
and concluded that "at times the treatment of plaintiffs
has skirted elemental standards of human decency." 75
The Court also warned the defendant prison officials not
to repeat these substandard conditions of the HSU at the
new, larger women's high security unit at Marianna,
Florida .
78
Two factors seem to have influenced the Court in de-
ciding that the Unit "at best meets the bare Eighth
Amendment standards. ' 77 The first was a recent opinion
of the D.C. Circuit substantially limiting application of
the Eighth Amendment.78 Given the decision in Occo-
quan, Judge Parker was obliged to "determine whether
the essential mainstays of life have been denied to the
prisoners," which the Occoquan court specified as "food,
shelter, health care and personal security."7 9 The second
and possibly more influential factor was the BOP's prom-
ise to promptly close the HSU.8"
Retaliation and Punishment for Political Beliefs and
Associations
The issue arising from the program at Lexington
HSU is whether the unit was designed to house women
who posed a security threat, or was in fact an isolation
74. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 445.
75. Id. at 446-447.
76. Id. at 447, 449. The FCI at Marianna, Florida is a
newly constructed medium-security prison for men. On its
grounds is an 54-cell sealed-off building designed and built as a
witness protection unit to house informants. Meeting between
ecumenical delegation and BOP Director Quinlan (December
17, 1987). The administration of the BOP decided to convert it
for use as a high security unit for women and to "transfer the
mission" of Lexington to this new location. Baraldini, 691
F.Supp. at 449.
77. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 447.
78. Inmates of Occoquan v. Barry, 844 F.2d 828, 839-40
(D.C. Cir. 1988).
79. Occoquan, 844 F.2d at 839. See Baraldini, 691 F.Supp.
at 447 (". . . plaintiffs have presented problems which should
not be ignored but they have not shown that they have been
denied the essential mainstays of life . . .").
80. See Baraldini v. Meese, Civil No. 88-0764 (D.D.C.
1988) Final Order of Judgment, at p. 3 ("That based on the
findings of the Court as to plaintiffs' Eighth Amendment claim,
because of the imminent completion and opening of the female
high and medium security facility at Marianna, Florida, the
Court denies relief for that claim . .. "). The Court also re-
jected plaintiffs' contention that assignment to the HSU trig-
gered a Fifth Amendment due process right to a pretransfer
hearing on the basis that placement violated other constitu-
tional rights. Plaintiffs were found to have no protected interest
in remaining in general population or in a specific prison.
Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 448.
camp to break prisoners affiliated with movements and
organizations condemned by the government.8 1
.The Bureau criteria for placement in the unit pur-
ported to be neutral and based on security considerations:
Candidates for placement in this unit are those fe-
males whose confinement raises a serious threat of
external assault for the purpose of aiding the of-
fender's escape."
It was neither. Official Bureau statements and the trans-
fer documents of Baraldini and Rosenberg, written by
Rosenberg testified that she was told by
the HSU unit manager that there was
only one way she could win her release
from the unit. to give up her political
affiliations.
Bureau officials, established that the women were se-
lected because of their political associations, and referred
to them as "terrorists.""3 Defendant BOP officials' corre-
spondence with congressional representatives and state-
ments to the media acknowledged the women's politics as
a factor relevant to their placement.84 Every transfer doc-
ument written by the defendants emphasized Baraldini's
and Rosenberg's associations with groups the government
considered to be terrorist.85
Moreover, Rosenberg testified that she was told by
the HSU unit manager that there was only one way she
could win her release from the unit: to give up her politi-
cal affiliations.86 The release criteria stated that release
would occur when the initially qualifying criteria no
longer applied. 87 Where the initially qualifying criteria
were one's political affiliations, the message is clear. Fur-
thermore, the defendants testified that if they received
81. The discussion in this section, as far as it refers to the
case, concerns only Susan Rosenberg and Silvia Baraldini, the
women placed in the HSU because of their associations. While
Alejandrina Torres' placement was based on her associations,
she did not participate in the litigation, and the defendants suc-
cessfully blocked the plaintiffs from discovery as to non-
plaintiffs.
82. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 435.
83. Stott, PLANNED WOMEN'S PRISON HIT (cited in note
36); Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 437.
84. Bureau of Prison's Director Michael Quinlan's letter to
U.S. Representative Robert Kastenmeier (September 30, 1987);
Bureau of Prisons Former Director Norman Carlson's letter to
U.S. Representative Robert Kastenmeier (October 9, 1986);
Stott, PLANNED WOMEN'S PRISON HIT (cited in note 36).
85. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 436. See text accompanying
note 37. FCI Pleasanton warden and defendant Roberts re-
ferred women convicted of activity related to "their committed
alliance to terrorist oriented ideas and politically revolutionary
organizations" for placement in HSU. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp.
at 438.
86. Testimony of Susan Rosenberg, Transcript at 76-77
(June 7, 1988).
87. Gil Ingram Memorandum (September 2, 1986); HSU
Institutional Supplement (December 3, 1986).
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information that a plaintiff were no longer affiliated with
the organizations, they would consider releasing them
from the HSU."9
A key post order for staff at the HSU informed them
that the unit was created for women who warranted
higher security because of, among other things, their
membership in organizations."
The defendants claimed that the women were selected
because they were escape risks, that the groups the
women associated with would assault the prison to free
them. Yet the evidence established that neither Baraldini
nor Rosenberg had ever conspired or attempted to escape,
nor had they actually escaped. 90 The defendants even ad-
mitted that they had no information of any threat of ex-
ternal assault to free the women, and that they had never
possessed any such information.91 In addition, the defend-
ants testified consistently that they had no knowledge
about the so-called terrorist groups they claimed these
women affiliated with. 92 Nor had they taken any action
to update information about the women after their con-
victions.9 3 The defendants also conceded that women who
had actually escaped from BOP custody, including one in
a helicopter, were not referred for transfer, or their refer-
rals for placement had been denied. Most remained in
general population, while 11 of the 16 cells at the HSU
remained unoccupied.9'
Plaintiffs' eminent corrections experts concluded after
examining the political women's prison files that nothing
in their in-prison conduct distinguished them from other
women who were convicted of violent crimes, given
This prison within a prison apparently
had' as one of its purposes to isolate and
break women members of militant
movements who the government would
call "terrorist."
equally lengthy sentences, and who remained in general
population."
The Court found the criteria for placement in the unit
88. Deposition of Gil Ingram at 55-56 (May 26, 1988);
Deposition of Robert Figlestahler at 169-170 (May 23, 1988).
89. FCI Lexington, KY., Post Orders for HSU General Op-
erating Procedures (November 10, 1987) ("Post Orders").
90. Deposition of Gil Ingram at 31 (May 26, 1988); Depo-
sition of Michael Quinlan at 61 (May 26, 1988); Deposition of
Rob Roberts at 153 (May 24, 1988); Deposition of BOP West-
ern Regional Director Jerry Williford at 46 (May 24, 1988).
91. See Post Orders (cited in note 89).
92. Deposition of Gil Ingram at 54 (May 26, 1988).
93. Deposition of Gil Ingram at 154 (May 26, 1988); Depo-
sition of Rob Roberts at 153-154, 155 (May 24, 1988).
94. Deposition of Gil Ingrari at 31-32 (May 26, 1988);
Deposition of BOP Southeast Regional Director Gary McCune
at 56-57 (May 27, 1988); Deposition of Rob Roberts at 179-
180 (May 24, 1988).
95. For example, prior to transfer to HSU, plaintiff
Baraldini had successfully served 27 months in the general pop-
ulation of the Federal Correctional Institution at Pleasanton, an
violated the First Amendment both on their face, as
vague and overbroad, and as applied to Baraldini and
Rosenberg. The Court enjoined the defendants to place
these women in the general population of a women's fed-
eral correctional institution, and to promulgate new crite-
ria which did not take into account a prisoner's political
beliefs and associations.
Finding that the criteria for placement in the unit
were overbroad, the Court held that the government's fo-
cus on prior associations, and consequent restriction of
the women's political expressions, violated the First
Amendment." The Court affirmed the prisoners' right to
believe, for example, in independence for Puerto Rico or
in communism, and stated:
It is no crime for Baraldini and Rosenberg to be
members of leftist political organizations, even if
those groups have engaged in unlawful pursuits in
the past. Since it cannot be inferred automatically
from their former memberships that they unquali-
fiedly subscribe to every aspect of the groups' con-
duct, their placement in the High Security Unit
cannot be justified without more credible documen-
tation than that found in the Bureau's records.97
Furthermore, the Court found that the government's in-
terest in preventing escape could have been accommo-
dated in less restrictive ways. 9 The line between those
placed at HSU and those remaining in the general popu-
lation was "blurred," and thus too vague to pass constitu-
tional muster."
The Court also determined that placement of
Baraldini and Rosenberg in the HSU served no legiti-
mate penological purpose, but rather constituted an exag-
gerated response to security concerns. In arriving at its
decision, the Court performed a Turner v. Safley'00 anal-
ysis, looking at four factors:
1) Whether there is a "valid, rational connection"
between the prison regulation and the legitimate,
neutral governmental interest.
2) If alternative means of exercising the constitu-
tional right remain open to prison inmates.
3) The impact an accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right would have on guards and other
inmates, and on the allocation of prison resources.
4) The absence of ready alternatives.'O
open, coed prison, where she mingled with hundreds of other
prisoners. Deposition of Gil Ingram at 29 (May 26, 1988); Dep-
osition of Silvia Baraldini at 25-26, 33, 37 (May 21, 1988);
Deposition of Michael Quinlin at 61-65 (May 26, 1988); Depo-
sition of Plaintiff's expert Louisa Brown at 37 (May 21, 1988);
Deposition of Jerry Williford at 35 (May 24, 1988).
96. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 439.
97. Id. at 439.
98. Id. at 440. For example, the evidence established that at
FCI Pleasanton, the prison operated a close accountability pro-
gram which, while it restricted a woman's movement, allowed
her to remain in the general population. See FCI Pleasanton
Memorandum (December 19, 1984).
99. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 440-441.
100. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96
L.Ed.2d 64 (1987).
101. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 443.
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Under the first factor, the regulations here, according
to the Court, were not neutral but rather focused on the
women's political views and associations. Under the sec-
ond factor, the Court found that Baraldini and Rosen-
berg had no alternative - only renunciation of their as-
sociations could win their release; therefore continued
expression and association was discouraged.102 Third, the
government offered no evidence of adverse impact of
placing the political women in general population. The
women's prior experience in general population and their
unremarkable disciplinary records convinced the Court of
the contrary. Finally, the existence of "ready alterna-
tives" renders the regulation an exaggerated response. 103
Clearly shocked by the government's program at the
HSU, the Court ended its opinion with these words:
It is one thing to place persons under greater secur-
ity because they have escape histories and pose spe-
cial risks to our correctional institutions. But con-
signing anyone to a high security unit for past
political associations they will never shed unless
forced to renounce them is a dangerous mission for
this country's prison system to continue.' 4
THE AFTERMATH
After months of ignoring Baraldini's requests for
medical attention for gynecological problems,'0 5 the de-
fendants at last allowed treatment, only to find that she
had a rare and very aggressive form of uterine cancer.
Ignoring Judge Parker's order, the defendants continued
to treat her as a high security prisoner throughout the
ordeal of two operations and internal radiation.
The defendants have refused to comply with Judge
Parker's unambiguous order that they place the political
prisoners in the general population of a women's federal
correctional institution. Instead, they have transferred
Baraldini and Torres'0 6 and designated Rosenberg 107 to
various federal Metropolitan Correctional Centers
(MCC's), with the full knowledge that these pretrial de-
tention facilities, designed for short term stays, are not
general population prisons where convicted prisoners
serve their sentences. 0 8
Another of the defendants' actions also flies in the
face of the Court's order. The injunction requires the de-
fendants "to ignore and nowise consider an inmate's po-
102. Id. at 443.
103. Id. at 444, citing Turner, 107 S.Ct. at 2262.
104. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 449.
105. Id. at 446.
106. While Torres, the only other political woman in the
unit, was not a plaintiff, the Court's order clearly applies to her,
and the defendants have so conceded.
107. Rosenberg is currently on a writ of habeas corpus ad
prosequendum, in custody at the District of Columbia jail to
face trial with five other northamerican political activists for
charges related to the bombings of government and military
buildings in the Capitol, alleged to have been done to force a
change in U.S. foreign policy in Central America and Southern
Africa.
108. Plaintiffs' motion to enforce compliance is pending
before Judge Parker.
litical views or affiliations in their decisions to transfer
any prisoner to the new high security unit at Marianna,
Florida."' 9 Yet on January 20, 1989, the defendants sent
Carol Saucier Manning to this new unit, a northamerican
political activist recently convicted of seditious conspir-
acy, for her participation in actions with the United Free-
dom Front, another group considered by the government
to be "terrorist" and using force against the United
States."  Manning, like Baraldini, Rosenberg, and
Torres, has no in-prison conduct which could justify the
placement, only a set of politics and associations "pro-
Consigning anyone to a high security
unit for past political associations they
will never shed unless forced to re-




moting some ideas that some government officials did not
favor.""'
In their arguments on appeal challenging the district
court's injunction, the defendants acknowledged their re-
liance on the women's political views and associations
and defended such reliance, asserting that the women's
politics are indistinguishable from the offenses for which
they were convicted. The defendants reasserted the de-
fense, rejected by the district court, that their concern
was with the women's contacts with groups that might
try to free them; regardless of the groups' ideology.
CONCLUSION
The government conducted an experiment with this
political prison. While the women suffered greatly, they
were not broken, and the news of these conditions caused
outrage. For example, the Puerto Rican legislature
passed a unanimous resolution condemning the U.S. gov-
ernment for violating the human rights of Alejandrina
Torres."' The U.S. received censure from groups as va-
ried as Amnesty International, members of the European
Parliament and the Italian Parliament, the National
Lawyers Guild, the American Public Health Association,
the United Methodist Church, and the United Church of
Christ."' Even at the U.S.-U.S.S.R. summit of 1988, the
109. Baraldini v. Meese, No. 88-764 (D.D.C. 1988), Final
Order of Judgment, at 3.
110. U.S. v. Raymond Levasseur, et al., No. 86-180-Y (D.
Mass 1988).
111. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 442.
112. House Resolution 1594 of the Puerto Rican Congress
(Session of May 18, 1988).
113. See, eg., letter from 15 members of European Parlia-
ment to BOP Director Quinlan (December 15, 1987); Resolu-
tion from Regione Autonoma Valle D'Aosta, Consiglio Region-
ale (February 24, 1988); Letters from NLG Executive Director
Michael Cowan to BOP Director Quinlan and Lexington War-
den DuBois (December 22, 1987).
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Soviet media raised the conditions at Lexington's HSU
and the existence of political prisoners in the U.S.1"
The government therefore decided to "phase out" the
HSU, announcing the intended closure months in ad-
vance of the actual closure, apparently in the hope of
avoiding further censure. Yet the closure of the HSU
brings only another phase of the experiment, not an end.
The "mission" of the HSU, the BOP says, is merely be-
ing transferred to a new high security unit, this one in-
side a new men's federal prison in Marianna, Florida. " 5
The mission still involves special, punitive treatment for
women political prisoners.
While the newest phase -has proved to be above
ground, and to have a population of one hundred, the
concern for the human rights of the women cannot abate.
A high level of attention and pressure from the public
had a definite impact on the government's conduct at the
HSU. Just as the decision to close the HSU can be at-
tributed to vocal opposition and the litigation, such vigi-
lance can temper the conditions at the HSU's successor
at Marianna, and influence how the government treats
political prisoners in the future.
114. UPI Moscow, "Soviets Charge U.S. Has Political Pris-
oners," Washington Post at A21 (May 28, 1988). The newspa-
pers asserting these charges included Pravda, the Communist
Party newspaper; Izvestia, the government newspaper; Trud,
the trade union newspaper; and Sovyetskaya Rossiya, the Com-
munist Party newspaper of the Russian Soviet Republic.
115. Baraldini, 691 F.Supp. at 449. See note 76.
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